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OT Atlas

Threats · Activity group

RASPITE

unknownIT access with OT relevanceDragosAttribution · Low
Last verified

Executive summary

RASPITE is reported for reconnaissance and access operations against electric utilities, including credential-theft techniques delivered through compromised websites. Reported activity is access-focused, with no publicly demonstrated ICS capability.

At a glance

Tracked byDragos
NexusReported by vendors as Iran-linked
First observed2018 (public reporting)
Last reportedContinued Dragos tracking
ICS kill chainStage 1 — Reconnaissance · Stage 1 — Intrusion

Rosetta Stone

Names across the industry

Every edge states the kind of relationship the public source supports — an alias is not the same as an overlap.

RASPITE
  • LeafMiner-adjacent reporting
    Technical overlapLow

    Tracked by Vendor reporting

Relevance

Why OT defenders care

Objectives

  • Credential theft from utility staff
  • Access to utility networks

Reported impacts

  • No publicly confirmed OT process effects

Observed behaviours

  • Compromised websites used to trigger forced authentication
  • Credential capture and reuse

Targeting

Sectors, geography and assets

Target industries

Electric power

Target geography

United StatesMiddle EastEurope

Observed assets

Corporate IT supporting OT

Protocols in scope

SMBHTTP

Capability

Malware and tools

Malware, commercial tooling, open-source utilities and native operating-system tools are kept separate — they demand different detections.

Malware

  • Watering-hole credential capture

Commercial tool

Not publicly established

Open-source utility

Not publicly established

Native OS tool

Not publicly established

ATT&CK

Technique mapping

ATT&CK Enterprise

ATT&CK for ICS

History

Known campaigns and incidents

Reported campaigns

Not publicly established

Atlas incident case studies

Not publicly established

Defence

Defensive hunting priorities

Start with the hunts below — each one is a complete procedure in the Field Playbook.

Priorities

  • Block outbound SMB
  • Monitor NTLM authentication anomalies
  • Credential hygiene for engineering staff

Hunt for this activity

No group-specific hunts mapped yet — start with the core hunt packs.

Indicators

Indicator guidance

Indicators expire. Behaviour usually ages better.

This registry deliberately does not republish volatile IP and domain lists. Pull current indicators from the linked authoritative reporting, match them locally against your own telemetry, and invest your standing detections in the behaviours listed above.
Last verified